Atrocities, Diamonds and Diplomacy Page 8

  Initially, Conakry was full of those who had fled Freetown but as the weeks turned into months, the numbers of international personnel dwindled. Most of the international agencies and NGOs returned to Europe and North America.

  However difficult life for us was in Conakry, it was far worse for the thousands of Sierra Leoneans who had fled there. For years Sierra Leoneans had looked down their noses at Guineans. De Gaulle had taken his spite out on the Guinean President, Sékou Touré, for not going along with French plans for ‘controlled decolonization’ by pulling the French out of Guinea lock, stock and barrel – the story went that even the telephone and electricity wires were removed. Guinea was left in a desperate state. By contrast, Sierra Leone was then a rich and developed country and Guineans came to Sierra Leone to shop and seek employment. Now the situation had been reversed and although Guinea was not rich, it enjoyed a degree of stability and development far beyond Sierra Leone’s. The Guineans did not welcome the influx of Sierra Leoneans, a position that was exacerbated by the language difference.

  The United Nations Commision for Human Rights (UNHCR) had established a refugee camp in Guinea at Fourecariah near the Sierra Leone border, but many Sierra Leoneans preferred to stay in Conakry. Many of them were from the professional classes, and life in a refugee camp held little attraction. However, in Conakry most of them had no homes, no jobs and no income. Some of them managed to find menial employment and others rented shacks on the outskirts of the city. A major problem was the education of their children. They could not put them into Guinean schools so they set up their own, informally. Several of the students who had fled became impromptu teachers.

  A constant stream of Sierra Leoneans appeared at the Hotel Camayenne seeking help. I did what I could. I would invite many of them to have a meal with me in the restaurant, knowing that for some, this would be the only meal they had had for days. They came from all walks of life – government ministers, teachers, students, businessmen, market women – the effect of the evacuation had been to bring everyone down to a common level.

  Zainab Bangura had had to flee Freetown with her husband and teenage son and she continued organizing the civil society groups in Conakry. Her energy and commitment was amazing. She got together the various women’s groups, trade unionists, teachers and students. She was constantly in touch with those back in Freetown, reporting on events, issuing statements, organizing meetings. I started attending some of these meetings, talking to them about democracy, urging them not to lose hope. Some of the younger Sierra Leoneans formed a new organization – the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD). Others would be constantly going in and out of the country, at great risk to themselves, to promote the resistance to the junta. These times were very inspirational. Many felt that we were not just fighting for the cause of democracy in Sierra Leone, but for the cause of democracy in Africa as a whole. In line with the statement issued by Kofi Anan, the UN Secretary-General, we were sending a message that military coups were no longer acceptable in Africa. The Overseas Development Organization (ODA) (predecessor of the Department for International Development, DFID) made some funds available to support such activities. ODA officials visited regularly from London. They were very committed and it was a pleasure working with them.

  For those left in Sierra Leone, life was even more miserable. Out of a population of over a million in Freetown, less than a third remained. People had either fled the country or moved back to their villages in the rural areas. To reach the Guinea border one had to run a gauntlet of over twenty road blocks manned by the soldiers and RUF, each demanding a payment to pass. Only those who had nowhere to go remained in Freetown. Less than ten per cent of shops and businesses were open, the banks remained closed. Despite continuing threats from the AFRC, very few people went to work, either to maintain their boycott of the regime or because there was no work to go to. As a result of the widespread looting and destruction, many offices were bare, devoid of even desks and chairs, let alone computers. It was a joke that many of the RUF had complained that many of the ‘televisions’ they had looted did not pick up the Sierra Leone television service. With the banks closed, money was in short supply. Anyone receiving any income found him/herself maintaining dozens of ‘relatives’.

  The looting continued, often accompanied by rapings and maimings. By 7.00 pm everyone returned to their homes and locked and bolted their doors and windows. Some of the Lebanese and Indian businessmen who had remained would even weld up their stores every night.

  The junta’s control of the rest of the country was even less tenuous. The main towns of Bo, Kenema and Makeni, where there were army bases, remained nominally under the control of the regime, but with even less appearance of government activity. Outside of Freetown the strongest presence of the AFRC and RUF was in Kono District, centre of the diamond mining industry, where the local populace was forced to mine for diamonds. The AFRC’s writ did not extend to the south of the country. There the Kamajors kept control in support of the Kabbah government.

  Koroma continued to issue statements trying to give the impression of a government in control. Endless people were appointed to official positions, often without being consulted in advance. An announcement would be carried over the radio that so-and-so was now an AFRC minister and that he should report to his new ministry. For the individual involved this was often the signal for him/her to flee the country.

  The RUF in Freetown

  From time to time a few international journalists managed to visit Freetown to report on the situation, which was easier said than done because of the absence of scheduled flights, and limited accommodation. Only one hotel was functioning in Freetown, the Cape Sierra.

  Michael Ashworth of the Independent visited and spent seven days waiting for an interview with Koroma. He was finally allowed to see one of the RUF leaders, Eldred Collins. Sitting in an office in State House wearing a cowboy hat and dark sunglasses and with a bandoleer of linked ammunition slung across his T-shirt on which was written ‘Save the planet’, Collins claimed to Ashworth that everything was normal and peaceful. Ashworth asked him why then were the banks closed? Collins said that they were not. Ashworth, who had spent the previous week trying to change some money, pointed out that they were. Fingering the gun by his side on the desk, Collins looked him in the eye and said, ‘I am telling you, the banks are open.’ In relating the story to me back in Conakry, Ashworth, who had served in the army himself and was familiar with hot spots around the world, said he was convinced that if he had argued further with Collins, the latter would have shot him on the spot. Ashworth filed several reports on the chaos and disorder in Freetown. While he was waiting at State House he witnessed a battered Mercedes full of soldiers with RPGs and AK47s sticking out of the windows come screeching around a corner. It narrowly missed a group of men and ploughed into a concrete pillar. The driver jumped out and kicked the car and the passengers jumped out and kicked the driver.

  Most of the RUF were constantly high on drugs. The use of drugs was a common feature of the RUF both in the bush and now in Freetown. Children as young as ten years old were weaned on a local drug known as ‘brown brown’, a powder, brown in colour, which was heated and inhaled, like cocaine. Marijuana, and another plant known as ‘kumbajarra’, traditionally used for keeping snakes away from homes, was grown widely. The two were mixed together with gunpowder and injected straight into the brain. It was quite common to see RUF kids walking around in a daze with a plaster on their forehead.

  Soon after I had arrived in Conakry I had sent a report to Ann Grant in the Foreign Office headed ‘Why We Should Not Deal With The RUF’. In it I noted how the RUF were now controlling Koroma and the AFRC. I detailed the terrible atrocities committed by the RUF. Although some outsiders had attempted to paint them as a well-meaning liberation movement, I described them as ‘a bunch of brutal thugs, surrounded by a mass of confused, simple people, led by a power crazed, untrustworthy zealot’. The idea that we should try to neg
otiate any deal with such people that would leave them in a position of power and influence, I found unacceptable. Even taking into account their lack of basic education and understanding, how could one envisage such people as ministers or senior officials in any government? For some time there had been an acceptable face of the RUF in the lead-up to the Abidjan Peace Accord, people like the Deen-Jallohs, Fayia Musa, Dr Barre and Philip Palmer; but events had shown that such people did not wield any real power and influence within the RUF. Where were they now that the RUF was in power? Probably tortured and killed by the very people they were purporting to represent. I concluded that we should not apply pressure on President Kabbah to do a deal with the RUF. It was not in our interests; it was not in Africa’s interests; it was not in Sierra Leone’s interests; and, as they had demonstrated most courageously, it was not what the Sierra Leoneans wanted.

  The RUF fighting had been described as a ‘civil war’ but I felt that this misrepresented the true situation. A civil war suggested two opposing sides, both with a clear political agenda, both attempting to win the hearts and minds of the people, with a clear dividing line, on either side of which the people supported the occupying forces. This was not the case in Sierra Leone. The RUF were out for power for power’s sake, merely to satisfy their greed. They ‘controlled’ only those areas where their forces were present, and even in these areas, they were generally unpopular. I was not alone with these views. Dr Joe Opala, an American anthropologist and historian, who had lived in Sierra Leone for twenty years and was about the most knowledgeable expatriate expert on the country, was to write:

  We must recognize that Sierra Leone did not suffer a civil war, but an episode of civil chaos. Once this is recognized, we should also recognize that negotiations with Sankoh are not the most important part of restoring order. Sankoh is a symptom of civil chaos, not its cause.

  His words were to prove most prophetic, though regrettably they failed to influence the US Government’s thinking at the time of the Lomé negotiations.

  I received a polite reply to my report from Ann Grant, saying in effect that in order to achieve peace, one often had to sit down with unsavoury characters.

  Civil Resistance to the Junta

  This might have been the considered view in London but it was clearly not what the Sierra Leone people felt. In Freetown and elsewhere in the country most of the people continued to ignore the AFRC junta. Inevitably there were a few Lebanese businessmen who remained to do their deals with the junta but they were in the minority as most of their colleagues had fled the country. One who remained but refused to have anything to do with the junta was Alhaji Hussein Jawad. Born in Sierra Leone of Lebanese parents, this remarkable man continued to build his Family Kingdom hotel complex close to the Mammy Yoko Hotel even though it seemed unlikely at the time that people from outside would ever enjoy the facility. His determination gave hope to the Sierra Leone people that at least there was one businessman who had faith that things would improve at some time in the future. He was to become a close friend.

  Perhaps the most remarkable show of solidarity against the junta was taken by the students. Notwithstanding the importance attached to gaining an education, they passed a resolution refusing to return to classes until the AFRC had stood down. As a result all the schools and colleges remained closed. In August they attempted to mount a demonstration on the streets of Freetown against the junta. It was ruthlessly put down by the soldiers. Several students were murdered and others were imprisoned. It became an offence against the junta to be a student. One student recounted how his cousin was ordered by the RUF to hack off his hand. When he put forward his left hand, the RUF rebel immediately insisted that he put his out his right hand ‘because he was a student’ and should not be allowed to write again.

  With the imposition of sanctions, food and fuel stocks became scarce. At one stage the junta managed to get a tanker through the Ecomog cordon, so that after weeks of no fuel for electricity or for vehicles, it was suddenly in supply. One would have imagined that the poor people of Freetown would have welcomed this respite from the tough life they were living, but in fact the opposite was true. On the day that the tanker reached Freetown my telephone in the hotel in Conakry never stopped ringing from people in Freetown saying, ‘I thought the international community was supposed to be operating an embargo. How did you let that tanker get through?’ Residents of Freetown would ring their relatives in Conakry telling them not to send in any food supplies to them. Although they were hungry, they knew that any food sent in would be stolen by the soldiers and rebels, and thus prolong their stay in power.

  ODA’s decision to suspend our aid programme, which I supported, was criticized by some British NGOs. The latter claimed that we were using humanitarian aid as a political tool, which would lead to innocent civilians dying. The matter was raised in the House of Commons. Guided by the views of the many Sierra Leoneans in the country with whom I was in touch, I had no doubt that our policy was right. In the rural areas outside the junta’s control the people were able to grow sufficient food for their needs. In Freetown and the other major towns, the junta requisitioned any food brought in. This whole debate was to become the focus of an Open University course on development.

  This civil resistance was to last nine months. It was a remarkable demonstration of determination and sacrifice.

  The international pressure on the AFRC to stand down continued. The OAU had been the first to condemn the coup. They had been meeting in Harare at the time of the coup, and the OAU statement calling for the immediate restoration of the democratic government was issued by President Mugabe in his capacity as Chairman of the OAU. It was followed by similar statements from around the world. The UN Secretary-General Kofi Anan had issued a particularly strongly worded statement:

  Last week, military elements in Sierra Leone toppled a democratically elected government. Africa can no longer tolerate, and accept as faits accomplis, coups against elected governments, and the illegal seizure of power by military cliques, who sometimes act for sectional interests, sometimes simply for their own. Armies exist to protect national sovereignty, not to train their guns on their own people. Some may argue that military regimes bring stability and predictability, that they are helpful to economic development. That is a delusion. Look at the example of South America, where the militaries are back in their garrisons, democracy thrives, and economies soar. Accordingly, let us dedicate ourselves to a new doctrine for African politics: where democracy has been usurped, let us do whatever is in our power to restore it to its rightful owners, the people. Verbal condemnation, though necessary, is not sufficient. We must also ostracize and isolate putchists. Neighbouring states, regional groupings, and the international community all must play their part.

  The OAU had designated the sub-regional grouping Ecowas (Economic Community of West African States) to pursue the return of the legitimate government in Sierra Leone. Following an Ecowas foreign ministers’ meeting in Conakry on 26 and 27 June, a communiqué was issued calling for a combination of three measures, namely dialogue, sanctions and the use of force, in order to achieve the reinstatement of the legitimate government. A subcommittee of foreign ministers from Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea and the Ivory Coast was established to ensure implementation within a time frame of two weeks. The Nigerian force still in Sierra Leone, joined by elements of the Guinean army, was identified as part of the regional Ecomog force that had been deployed in Liberia for some time to help bring order there. The time frame of two weeks proved far too optimistic. The Liberian Foreign Minister was added to the subcommittee, to be known as the C5, following the ‘democratic’ elections that brought Charles Taylor to power. Several meetings were held as the tortuous attempts to find a peaceful solution continued culminating at the end of the year with the Conakry Peace Plan.

  It was, of course, not surprising that Nigeria was playing this leading role. Nigeria, by far, dominated the affairs of West Africa. In size and population it was ten
times bigger than the rest of West Africa combined. However, her influence presented problems for us and other Western countries at the time. Nigeria was being ostracized by the international community because of the dictatorial military regime headed by Sani Abacha, which showed little respect for human rights and few moves towards a democratic system. Though we maintained diplomatic relations, sanctions against Nigeria were in place and her membership of the Commonwealth had been suspended. It was therefore ironic that she should be playing the leading role in securing the return of democracy in Sierra Leone. On my and others’ advice, British ministers decided to ‘ring-fence’ the activities of Nigeria with regard to Sierra Leone; although we welcomed what she was doing there as a force for good, we noted that this would not stop us criticizing her for what was going on in her own country.

  While Nigeria was in the forefront of the regional efforts, Britain led the international efforts to secure the restoration of the Kabbah government. We arranged for Shirley Gbujama, Kabbah’s Foreign Minister, to attend a conference at Wilton Park on ‘Stability in Africa’ and followed this by organizing and funding a conference in London in November entitled ‘Restoring Sierra Leone to Democracy’, to which over 200 people were invited to listen to speeches by President Kabbah and Tony Lloyd. The most moving presentation was delivered by Zainab Bangura. While she was speaking, stills were flashed up on a screen behind her of some of the atrocities committed by the RUF and AFRC. Some people in the audience wept at the sight of decapitated bodies lying in pools of mud and blood.

  From the London conference, Kabbah was flown in a specially chartered flight, together with his delegation comprising Thaimu Bangura, Shirley Gbujama, James Jonah, Momodou Koroma, Cyril Foray, the Sierra Leone High Commissioner, and myself, to Edinburgh to attend the Commonwealth heads of government meeting as the special guest of Tony Blair. Nearly forty heads of state attended the meeting, including Nelson Mandela, who grabbed the headlines by promoting the cause of the relatives of the Lockerbie bombing. Kabbah had several bilateral meetings, including with Tony Lloyd, whom he asked whether the British Government would be prepared to supply arms and ammunition to help achieve the restoration of his government. He was turned down.