Atrocities, Diamonds and Diplomacy Page 9

  In their communiqué issued at the end of the conference, all the Commonwealth heads of government condemned the coup in Sierra Leone and called for the immediate reinstatement of President Kabbah, whom they welcomed to the meeting. The CHOGM communiqué also welcomed the UN resolution imposing petroleum, weapons and travel restrictions on the junta in Sierra Leone. The UK delegation in New York had been actively involved in drafting this resolution, Number 1132, which was passed on 8 October. Sitting in Conakry at the time, I was aware of the UN resolution but did not receive a copy from the Foreign Office, nor, more importantly, a copy of the later UK Order in Council putting the UN resolution into effect in Britain. At the time that did not seem important.

  With all their efforts to promote the restoration of the Kabbah government, the officials in the Foreign Office in London became increasingly frustrated at the seeming lack of energy shown by President Kabbah himself to get back to Sierra Leone. Kabbah acquired a nickname in Conakry among his fellow Sierra Leoneans of ‘Pretty Soon’, as whenever he was asked when they would get back to Sierra Leone he would reply ‘pretty soon’. The British Government had said that it wanted ‘an African solution to an African problem’, but it was not prepared for it to be determined by an African timeframe.

  London asked me to urge Kabbah to be more proactive. A stream of directives were issued from London telling Kabbah to do this or do that. For a government that was seemingly embarrassed about its colonial past, the instructions I received from the Foreign Office on what to say to President Kabbah were more forthright than when I had been serving as a governor of one of our colonial dependencies.

  Though I shared London’s frustration, to be fair to Kabbah, he was limited in what he could do. He had no source of funding. Apart from a few energetic ministers like Momodou Koroma and Shirley Gbujama, and others like James Jonah and Zainab Bangura, he had few reliable people to whom he could turn. There was still an element of mistrust between Kabbah and Sam Hinga Norman. When I had first arrived in Conakry, I had discovered that they were not even talking to one another. Kabbah referred to Norman as a ‘loose cannon’. I advised that the best way to deal with a loose cannon was to tie it down and ensure that it was firing in the right direction! I urged both Kabbah and Norman to bury their differences and work together for the good of the country. Sam Norman later told me that this was the best advice I had ever given him.

  In terms of a fighting force under Kabbah’s direct command, other than a few loyal army and Special Security Division (SSD) with Ecomog at Lungi Airport, he only had the Kamajors, who had ensured that the south of the country remained loyal to the Kabbah government. They had now been joined by other similar tribal groups from around the country, the Kapras, the Gbethis, the Donsos and the Tamaboras, to form the Civil Defence Force (CDF). Norman was given the challenging task of co-ordinating the activities of the CDF from within the country but under the control of a committee headed by the Vice President, Joe Demby, stationed at Lungi with Ecomog and answerable directly to the President.

  Norman initially based himself in Monrovia, from where he would cross over the border into Sierra Leone, until Charles Taylor came to power. Taylor’s support for Sankoh and the RUF meant that Norman’s life was at risk in Monrovia and he moved permanently into Sierra Leone, where he was helped by the Fijian ex-SAS soldier Fred Marafono with the training and operations of the CDF. A training camp was set up, Base Zero, in the Bonthe area. Vital to its operation was ‘Bokkie’. Bokkie was the nickname for an Mi-17 helicopter that originally had belonged to Executive Outcomes. When EO pulled out, the helicopter was taken over by another private security firm, Sandline, of which much more later. Bokkie provided a vital airbridge between the Ecomog base in Monrovia and the Ecomog forces at Lungi, and also for the CDF at Base Zero. It was flown by an outstanding ex-EO South African pilot, Johann Joubert, or Juba. The exploits of Bokkie being flown by Juba with Fred wielding his GPMG (General Purpose Machine Gun) from the open door became legendary. They were expertly told in Hamish Ross’s book, From SAS to Blood Diamonds War.

  Norman claimed to Ecomog that the CDF could muster up to 37,000 fighters from the various chiefdoms in support of the Ecomog operation. The CDF undoubtedly fought bravely for Kabbah’s restoration, but they continuously lacked logistical support and equipment. Militarily Kabbah was essentially dependent upon the Nigerians and the Guineans and he did not want to do anything to displease them. He rarely left the confines of his villa in Conakry; not to the refugee camp at Fourecariah, not even to his embassy directly opposite the villa complex where hundreds of his fellow countrymen were gathered. Mostly the trips he made were outside Guinea, to Nigeria to see Abacha.

  Thanks largely to the British Government’s efforts, not one country in the world, not even Libya or Cuba, for example, recognized the illegal AFRC junta – a significant diplomatic achievement. However, to ensure that support for the Kabbah government did not waiver among the international community, it was important to promote an image of a semi-functioning government ready to return and pick up the reins of governing the country. The ODA arranged a workshop in the UK whose task was to prepare a ‘ninety-day action plan’ covering the priorities of the first three months of President Kabbah’s government after restoration. Thirty Sierra Leoneans were flown back to the UK from Conakry and joined by others, including leading British businessmen such as Clive Dawson, who was working hard behind the scenes to support the restoration. The plan was presented at the London conference ‘Restoring Sierra Leone to Democracy’.

  In Conakry, a Sierra Leone government office was set up using ODA funds. We rented a run-down building, which had been an Indian restaurant on one of the main thoroughfares, and stuck up a sign saying ‘Government of Sierra Leone’. A very tight rein was kept on the UK funds made available for the purpose. I told President Kabbah that it was not our intention to subsidize the cost of all his ministers, several of whom, in my opinion, had proved themselves useless. Programmes were run from the Conakry Government Office to promote the cause for the restoration of democracy in Sierra Leone, including monitoring the UN sanctions imposed upon the junta.

  The basis on which we felt confident to promote the return of the Kabbah government was not only the legitimacy of the democratic election but the will and determination shown by the Sierra Leone people that this was what they wanted. It was important, therefore, to support them in their struggle and encourage them not to lose hope in the face of the sacrifices they were making, especially inside the country. But how to get this message across? The AFRC had banned the independent newspapers and radio stations. Radio was by far the most influential sector of the media. With such a high illiteracy rate and a television service reaching just the couple of hundred sets in Freetown, it was through the radio that people were kept informed. The BBC World Service, especially its two African programmes, Network Africa and Focus on Africa, was required listening for all Sierra Leoneans. The situation in Sierra Leone dominated the African news and often the programmes carried heartfelt messages from Sierra Leoneans requesting help to rid them of the oppressive junta in Freetown.

  Following a discussion with Mukesh Kapila in the ODA, we decided to fund a clandestine pro-democracy radio station. One of Sierra Leone’s leading academics and a former newspaper editor, Dr Julius Spencer, was brought back from the United States to set it up. Radio 98.1 Democracy was an instant success. Operating initially out of a tent at Lungi Airport behind the Ecomog lines, the radio broadcast to the people of Freetown sixteen hours a day. It reported on the international support for President Kabbah’s government and the calls for the AFRC to stand down. Thanks to an effective network of informers in Freetown, mainly students, the station was able to report in detail on the activities of the AFRC and RUF, highlighting their crimes and misdeeds.

  Radio 98.1 really got up the noses of Koroma and his cohorts. No sooner had they held a meeting among themselves, than details of what had been discussed was being broadcast to the peo
ple. The junta was continually trying to discover from where the radio station was broadcasting. They warned people not to listen to it. One 80-year-old woman was killed for just doing so. Along with the BBC’s Focus on Africa, Radio 98.1 became the main source of information to the Sierra Leone people about what was going on in their country and outside. It was a source of much strength and encouragement to the residents of Freetown, who went to bed with their radios underneath their pillows to dampen the reception, listening to Spencer and his colleagues.

  We deliberately did not publicize our support for Radio 98.1 for fear of reprisals being taken against our staff and properties but from time to time I would give a live interview by telephone from my hotel room in Conakry in which I encouraged the people to keep faith with democracy and not to lose hope. Because of these interviews and my other activities, I became one of the ‘enemies of the AFRC revolution’. When John Flynn, a retired member of the Diplomatic Service, was made the Secretary of State’s Special Representative to Sierra Leone, the AFRC misinterpreted his appointment as my successor. One of the few pro-AFRC newspapers allowed to operate, We Yone, produced an editorial headed ‘Good Riddance to Penfold’.

  Conakry Peace Plan

  Towards the end of 1997 spirits were raised with the signing of the Conakry Peace Plan, which had been pushed through by Tom Ikimi, the enigmatic Foreign Minister of Nigeria. The plan called for an immediate ceasefire and the disarmament of all combatants leading to the restoration of President Kabbah under a power-sharing arrangement by 22 April 1998. There were many problems with the plan. Firstly there was the question of whether the AFRC could be trusted to honour their side of the agreement. People had not forgotten earlier in the year when a previous AFRC delegation, when meeting the C5 ministers in Abidjan, had agreed for the AFRC to step down. Before the ink was dry on the document, Koroma had announced from Freetown that he intended to remain in power until the year 2001. Secondly, there was the danger that the AFRC would interpret the agreement as giving them de facto recognition as the Government of Sierra Leone, something that we had been studiously avoiding; and thirdly, would the people of Sierra Leone accept such a power-sharing agreement after holding out so resolutely against the AFRC and RUF?

  President Kabbah’s government had not been involved in the Conakry meeting, although Solomon Berewa, his Attorney-General, had sat in as an ‘observer’. A copy of the Plan had been faxed through to Kabbah while he was in London. James Jonah, among others, voiced concerns about it, but Kabbah, under strong pressure from the Nigerians, said he was prepared to go along with it. The international community supported the Plan. Tony Lloyd saw the shortcomings but, in the absence of anything else, felt that the Plan represented the best chance of a peaceful solution. The AFRC demanded an immediate lifting of the UN sanctions. But this was refused.

  In early December we learned that the AFRC was still bringing in weapons. They had rehabilitated the old airstrip at Magburaka and a consignment of arms and ammunition originating in Ukraine had been flown in from Burkino Faso. Steve Bio, the brother of the former head of state, had made the arrangements. It appeared that the AFRC had little intention of standing down. This view was further reflected in copies of letters that President Kabbah acquired, which revealed that dissident elements in the UK, such as Abass Bundu, a former foreign minister convicted for selling passports, and Omrie Golley, a discredited Sierra Leone lawyer, were advising Koroma to play for time. They argued that the longer the AFRC stayed in power, the more likely the solidarity displayed by Ecowas and the international community would begin to fragment. There was the added bonus that the longer the AFRC stayed in power, the more they could exploit the diamonds and make themselves and their supporters rich. On at least one occasion, Golley passed through Conakry carrying diamonds for the AFRC junta.

  The year 1997 had not been easy for me and Celia. Although I had managed to get back to the UK on several occasions, we had been unable to spend much time together. Originally she had been expected to join me in Freetown on completion of her studies at Oxford, where she was studying theology and philosophy. The coup and evacuation had totally disrupted these plans. While I was stuck in Conakry, she continued her studies, but the separation was having an effect. London agreed that I could have a complete break from Sierra Leone affairs for six weeks over Christmas and New Year. It was not an ideal time to be going away. With the junta reneging on its commitments under the Conakry Peace Plan, the situation in Sierra Leone was becoming tense. I argued with London that in my absence there should be cover in Conakry over the holiday period. Colin Glass was not due to come out until early January and with his family commitments I did not want to disrupt his Christmas/New Year plans, so Dai Harries was asked to interrupt his Portuguese language training prior to his posting to Maputo to provide cover. The arrangements were put in train.

  Chapter Four

  Contacts with Sandline

  Before leaving Conakry on 19 December I called on President Kabbah at his villa to wish him a merry Christmas and to check whether he had any messages to take back to London. As usual we met alone in the large living room on the ground floor of the villa. He sat sprawled out on the luxurious leather settee and I sank into one of the large armchairs. Although our meetings were always very relaxed, we still maintained the diplomatic courtesies of addressing each other, ‘Your Excellency’.

  During the meeting he showed me in confidence a faxed copy of a draft contract that he had recently received. I read it quickly. The contract was between a Canadian mining company called Blackstone and the Government of Sierra Leone. In return for mining concessions from the government, Blackstone would make available to a company called Sandline up to US $10 million for the purchase of equipment and the provision of personnel and training to support President Kabbah’s restoration. I did not recall that the draft contract made any specific mention of arms, but given the amount of money involved I assumed that arms would be included as part of the package. I had not heard of Blackstone but the company Sandline and its boss, Tim Spicer, had been brought to my attention only recently in watching CNN reports on the television in my hotel room about its activities in Papua New Guinea.

  There was much confusion about the linkage between Branch Energy, Executive Outcomes, Lifeguard and Sandline, partly of their own deliberate making in order to blur the various connections. The Foreign Office had arranged for me to call on Branch Energy as part of my pre-posting briefing. The British company had mining concessions to mine kimberlite in Kono District. After his evacuation from Freetown, Branch Energy’s representative, Rupert Bowen, had reappeared in Conakry towards the end of the year. Given the letter he had sent to Robin Cook, I did not go out of my way to meet him, but from time to time he turned up at the bar of the Hotel Camayenne. When President Kabbah terminated the contract with the South African based firm, Executive Outcomes, as part of the Abidjan Peace Accord, an affiliated company, Lifeguard, remained in Sierra Leone to provide security at the Branch Energy mine and also at the Sierra Rutile mine, owned by a multi-national conglomerate including Hanson Trust. Spicer always maintained that his Bahamian registered company, Sandline, had no connection with Branch Energy or Executive Outcomes, but it may be more than coincidental that Sandline’s London offices were at the same address as Branch Energy and that some of EO’s personnel were also used by Sandline.

  President Kabbah asked me whether the British Government was likely to provide a similar package of assistance. I told him that the British Government was firmly committed to the restoration of his government, but we preferred to see this achieved by peaceful means through the implementation of the Conakry Peace Plan. I saw no likelihood that we would provide arms and ammunition. I was confident of this view not just because of the conversation that he had had with Tony Lloyd in Edinburgh, but I had previously attended an inter-ministry meeting in London and had raised the question of us supplying boots and uniforms for the 1,000 or so soldiers and policemen loyal to Kabbah who were
with the Ecomog forces at Lungi. The reaction at the meeting, even for this type of equipment, had not been positive.

  Kabbah sought my advice on the contract. I made it clear that the decision was for him to make. He referred to the positive help given by EO in the past and noted that at his last meeting with Abacha in Abuja the latter had encouraged him to seek help ‘from wherever’ for his loyal forces to strengthen Ecomog. Although he did not wish to mortgage the future of his country by signing deals like this, he noted that when he did return he would need to get a grip on the diamond mining industry. This had traditionally fallen into the hands of unscrupulous individuals and corrupt ministers and officials with the result that the country’s diamond wealth had never benefited the economy. He would probably go ahead and sign the contract. As neither he nor I considered that the UN sanctions applied to his government, no mention was made of them. Kabbah said that he would ask Spicer to get in touch with me when I was in the UK.

  I flew back to London on the overnight flight and on the following day I went up to the Foreign Office from my home. Celia came with me to pick up her passport and to do some Christmas shopping. Spicer had telephoned and we arranged to meet for lunch after my meeting in the Foreign Office.